Iraq's Shadow Economy by Looney, R.E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive




Looney, R.E., "Iraq's Shadow Economy," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e
Commerciali, vol. LII, no. 4, December 2005, pp. 561-579.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40488
R1V1STA INTERNAZIONALE m SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMl)lERCJALI 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
Vol. LII, No. 4 - December 2005 
REPRINT 
ROBERT LOONEY 
IRAQ'S SHADOW ECONOMY 
---------------
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF BOCCONI UNIVERSITY AND nrn VNIVERS!TY or MILAN 
CE DAM 
RISEC, Volume 52 (2005), No. 4, 561-579 




Accurate economic intelligence is critical in designing policies, strategies 
and investments for J.raq's economic. recovery. Unfortunately, very little is 
known about the country's .economic progress over the last several decades1, 
let alone the current situation. Jn fact, there are huge gaps in even the most 
routi.ne data compiled by nearly every c,0untry. The Intefl}ational Monetary 
Fund, for instance, does not have any data on even the balance. sheets of the 
central bank or the financial system since 1977, let alone national income 
accounts (missing since 1993),: prices, interest rates, or the balance of 
payments (Hanke and Sekerke, 4003). Today, tlie insurgency and persistent 
insecurity has made even the simplest dat~-gathering exercises almost 
impossible to conduc;t. the picture we have and are likely to have for some 
time will, by necessity, be derived from indirect)ndicators and inference2• 
The pi9ture we have is an economy stagnating during the period from 
1989 to. 2003 with short run periods of improvement simply reflecting 
favorable .developments in oil markets. It is also safe. to say that two 
successive wars and twelve years of eccmomic .sanctions resulted in a cl;rronic 
long run deterioration of the eco:nomy, both in tenns of its actual 
performance, and,,perhaps more importantly it.s ability to resume growtP, in 
the post-Saddam era. In addition, we also know that during the period of 
sanctions in the 1990s both industrial and agricultural production faltered ~or 
•Naval Postgradu11te S~hool, Monterey, CA (U.S.A.). E-mail: rel@ney@11p~,,_edu 
The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier 
draft of the paper. . 
1 Perhaps the best accounts available have been provided by Alnasrawi ( 1994, 2002). 
2 A good survey of the standard methods is contained in Chen and Wan·g, (2003). 
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lack of inputs. Constraints·on oil revenues even caused the government sector 
to contract during this peri()d. As the government sector contracted in size 
and influence, large segments of the population were left to survive on their 
own wit and skill. 
The rough picture we have of the present is one of an economy that 
probably contracted by about 35% in 2003, but recovering somewhat in 2004 
- the final extent to which will be largely.dependent on developments in the 
oil sector. At least 30% (Economi~t h1tdlligence Unit,· 2004a) of the labor 
force is unemployed with 60% depending on food rations to survive. A 
November 2004 survey (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004b) of 28,500 Iraqi 
families conducted by the government's Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
found the average monthly income of an Iraqi family was US$ I 27. Of those 
surveyed, only 15% had not completed elementary school, but just 9% had 
graduated from high ·school. Twenty percent of the respondents were 
illiterate. 
Qualitatively, tpe. economy is currep.tly divided among several main 
groups. A formal economy ¢orriprised of: (a) the oil sector, (b) government 
administrative/security mirtistries and agencies, (c) the tirlproouctive, 
inefficient state·o~ed companies,' ( c) · soll}e privatized industriaVagricul!Ural' ! 
companies owned by fonnet cronies 'of Saddam Hussein, ( d) a group of large I 
ltlerchant/agricultUrar:rammes·.who have somehow survived the old regithe, 
and (e) the large foteigh companies like Bechtel, Louis Berger, et~. and their 
workers tinder contract for recbnstructiqn work. The r¢st of the economy. is 
comprised · largely of informal elements: ·• (a) a· looter·~ 1 class of 
ehtrep~tieuts/smuggldr8:... the so-called ()3raude, 2003, p; 120) ~·cats ofthe· 
Embargo"'who shrupened their skills duiing'thh.$arictions in the ·.1990s~ and 
(b) a nebulous informal ·or "shadow" ecoriclmy that e>cists jn one Jortn. or 
another on the fringes of the.more brganized segments of~he''ecori6my ... · · 
While we still don't hav'e. a clear picture· of the eontemporary dYfiamics of 
the Iraqi economy, it's still safe to sayiliat the«~oµntry's econoriliC health \\rfn 
be ··a key determinant of its long nili. stability <JI otig, 2004, p. · 9) .. Clearly 
factors such as the lack of c,otnmercial credit (Lqoney; 2005), 'together with 
uncertainty due to the sec,~niy situatioii.'.have largely 'brotiglitinvestmenf in 
the formal segments of die economy to· a· halt. (IRINnews:org, 2004). Yet, 
from antidotal acc<;>tints3 there··ru-e·indications that many·areas-0f the·shadow 
economy are prospering and, as durlng tlle'pefiod of satfotions, sliccessfully 
adapting to the harsh environment. 
By its very nature, however the informal or shadow economy's size in Iraq 
3 For example: H~lli:c2QQ4), Fl~ishman (2004); Re.¢ (20041. · 
\ 
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is hard to observe. Still there are indirect ways of measuring it. Keeping in 
mind the limited amount of economic data available ·even on the formal 
segments of the economy, the sections below provide an initial bit of 
economic intelligence on this potentially vital area of economic activity. In 
particular: (a) What are the main areas of activity comprising the shadow 
economy? (b) What factors are most important in effecting the overall size of 
this segment of the economy? and ( c) As an initial step in estimating the 
cun-ent size of the country's current shadow economy, what was its extent 
toward the end of the Saddam Hussein era? 
2. Definitional Issues 
While definitions of the informal or shadow economy arc somewhat 
arbitrary, most researchets4 agree that it is largely comprised of small-scale 
producers and their employees, together with ·the self-employed producing 
goods as well as those engaged in commerce, transport and the provision of 
services. Street vendors are the most visible activities in th(: ~nformal sector. 
However the output of small workshops and the self-employed who often 
work at home is likely more important .in t~rms of the numbers involved, 
The important characteristic of the sector is th.at its output has.the potential 
to be sold either as intermediate goods arid services to other producers or to 
final users. In this sense the activities ofthe sector are no different than those 
of the formal sector;Thatthe shadow economy is not measured and included 
in the country's GDP figures stems largely from the fact that data on its 
activity is both difficult and expensive to collect. One important point to note 
concerning the informal sector is that the goods and services being introduced 
are perfectly legal and that generally no laws are being broken in their 
production and distribution. 
One can make a further delineation of shadow activities by distinguishing 
between purely legal activities and those which involve some illegality such 
as tax evasion, the avoidance of regulations· (minimum wage, factory safety 
legislation, child labor faws, etc.) and social security fraud. 1be main 
characteristic of this group of activities is that while the goods and services 
that· form the output are perfectly legal, the productiot1 and/or distribution of 
these goods and services involve some illegality. Size aside, these activities 
in particular represent difficult measurementproblems since those involved 
in lawbreaking activities are unlikely to make this information available to 
4 The standard works in the area include:· Schneider and Enste (200~), Thomas ( 1992), and 
for the Middle East region, Lobban ( 1998). \ 1 
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the statisticians constructing the· national income accounts. 
Operationally, there are several ways to contrast the shadow economy 
from its formal counterpart. The ·approach taken by the ·International ·Labor 
Organization {ILO, 1970, 1972) stresses the nature of activities with the 
shadow economy characterized by: 
• Ease of entry 
• Reliance on indigenous resources 
• Family ownership of enterprise 
• Small scale of operation 
• Labor intensive methods of production and adapted technology 
• Skills acquired outside the formal school system 
• Unregulated and competitive markets 
In contrast the formal sector is distinguished by: 
• Difficult entry . 
• Frequent reliance on overseas resources 
• Corporate ownership 
• Capital intensive and often imported technology · · 
• Formally acquired skills often expatriate · 
• Protected'm~rkets (thfough tariffs quotas and trade Hccnse~)s: 
Instead of activities one could delineate ,the shadow and formal sectors 
based .on individuals;and whether or not 'they :were wage earning {formal 
sector) or self-: employed (informal sector) (Weeks, 1975). On this basis 
formal income opportunities include: 
1. PUblic sector wages 
2. Private sector wages 
3. Transfer payments -pensions, unemployment benefits. 
While shadow income opportunities can be. divided between legitimate 
activities: 
1. Primary. and secondary activities - farming, market gardening, building 
contractors· and associated activities, self-employed artisans, shoe-makers, 
tailors · · 
2. Tertiary enierprises with relatively large capital inputs - housin~ transport, 
utilities · 
s This describes the condition- in most countries, althoqgh soon after the ovel}hrow of 
Saddam Hussein, Iraqi tariffs were lowered to a flat 5% for mds\goods. ·,•: · 
' ',, 
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3. Small-scale distribution~ matket operatives, petty traders, street venders, 
food caterers, carriers 
4. Other serVices ~launderers, shoe shiners, barbers, photographers, vehicle 
repair and other maintenance workers, ritual services 
5. Private transfer payments ..:: gifts and 'similar flows of money and goods 
between persons; botrowing,·begging 
and illegitimate activities: 
1. Hustlers, receivers of stolen goods~ usury and pawn broking (at illegal 
interest rates), drug pushing, prostitution, smuggling, bribery, political 
corruption, protection rackets 
2. Transfers - petty theft (e.g. pickpockets), larceny (burglary and armed 
robbery), embezzlement, gambling. 
In sum,· the formal sector includes government activity itself and tlj.ose 
ent~rprises in the private sector which are officially res;pgnized, nurtured 'and 
regulated by the state. Operations in the sh~dow ecoi,lb\UY '6re ch.aracterized 
by an absence of such benefits. Enterpris~s and indiyidqe}ls operate outside 
the system of benefits and regulations of gov~rnment an4 ·thus without access 
to the formal credit institutions and sources oftnmsferofforeign technology. 
In sum, many of the participants (n this se¢tor qperate illegally, though 
pursuing economic activities similar tO thos¢ in the formal sector. Illegality 
then is often not so piuch a cortsequence of the nature Of the . activity but 
instead der~ves , from ~n a,~oi:dance o{ the govern,ment.'. Because of the 
difficulties involveo in delineating the shadow economy from the informal 
economy, both t~rms will, be used· int~rchangeab~y in the analysis that 
follows. 
3. Estimating the 'Size of the Informal Economy -'The Saddam Era 
Conventional ,:neasures used to arrive at rough estimates of the share of the 
country's shadow economy in Gross National Product usually (Frey and 
Weck, 1983) approach the prol:>lein by.ideptifyi11g either,: (a) jnconsistencies 
in the .·national .income accql,\nts .and assuming these .. inconsistencies are 
caused by the informale<;:onomy (MacAfee,1980), {b) the difference between 
actual and expected holding of currep.cy .(Feige, 1990), or, (c) linkages wi,th 
the use of physical inputs suchas electricity (Kavfmann and ~aliberda, 199(:)), 
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3.1. Data on the Shadow Economy. - At the present time, the dearth of Iraqi 
data in each area rules out the use of these methods. In their place an 
alternative method, a statistical analysis of informal economies in a large 
sample of countries was undertaken. . The . atte~pt is. to idcntif y causal 
relationships . between known institutional/econor.riic variables and their 
associated shadow economies in various coµntries. Based on these 
relationships and the further assumption that despite its troubled history the 
Iraqi economy is roughly subject to the same forces as other economies 
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Figure 1. Per capita income and the informal economy 
A recent World Bank study (Schneider, 2002) and associated data set of 
the informal economy in 110 countries for the 1999/2000 period provided the 
input for this analysis. A preliminary examination (Figure 1) of the data 
suggests there is a very rough association between the size of the informal 
economy and per capita income. In general, the pattern suggests the higher 
the per capita income the lower the informal economy as a share of GNP. 
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informal economy moving from higher to lower per capita incomes. This 
pattem bottoms Out at a per capita income of around $5,000 with little 
increase in the informal economy at lower per capita incomes. 
The non-linearity ofthe per-capita income/informal economy relationship 
suggests that the size of the shadow economy inay be the result of a set of 
composite envirorimental factors such as the ptogress made towards a more 
open, equitable, transparent economy andior governance institutions 
conducive to the spread 'of the formal economy. Fortunately, while there is a 
general dearth of economic data on the Iraqi economy, several widely used 
· governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003) an.d economic reform 
(Heritage Foundation, 2004) data bases include a complete set of data for 
Iraq. The govem11:qce data set covers the periodfromJ996 to.2002, while the 
economic fre~dom.data set spans the years from J995 to 2003. 
Th~s data is 4ighly relevant for identifyipg Iraq's shadow economy. The 
importance of institutions in affecting the pa~em of national growth al}.d 
development is increasingly recognized (Rodrik, 2004). More importantly the 
impact that governance failures such as corruption have had on the 
development of a shadow economy has been extensively· documented in the 
professional literature.6 
In Iraq's case the break-down in governance under S,addam clearly 
contributed to the development of the shadow economy. This was particularly 
tru~ during the period of sanctions in the 1990s. Several quotes from Braude 
vividly recreate the atmosphere of the time: 
Iraq under Saddam and sanctions has produced a most bizarre Iraqi business 
culture. Effective business practices not only went unrewarde(,i, they were 
effectively discouraged. For example advertising. When you advertise you 
show people - especially Saddam's gangs - that you are doing busirtess. They 
will demand their cot from you and destroy you if you refuse. If you do not 
have someone to protect you, then you want no one to notice. you (Braude, 
2003, p.116). 
. . . - . 
Legal and ,bureaucratic re.strictions became fucreasirtgly irrelevant You are 
supposed to incorporate, but if you don.'t no one will notice. I never registered 
my business. If you go to the Trade Office, everybody will 19low. So one way 
to keep a low profile is not to register your company. One year after opening 
my shop a government inspector came, and I just had to pay him a bribe 
(Braude, 2003, p. 118). 
How wide-spread these types ofgovemment-shakedowns were is anyone's 
6 Cf. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann a~d Zoido-Lobaton (2000); Johnson, Kaufman anf' 
Zoido-Lobaton (1998). \ 
- I 
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guess. However if tll<?Y did exisi. on a wide,-scale Iev~l J~ o~e~:co~ntries as 
well as Iraq, tlw ,,<Ja~ sets noted abQ\le ,have the pot~nti~l Jor :arriying at a 
rough estimate of the §ize of the shade>w.~c,qn,oµiy; A!J.~t4er~adv~nJage of ,tJ>:e 
governance pod ,espnQ~ic freep()tµ da~a s.ets. sfetps frqpi, .tJie f~ct that they can 
be extencte.<J. tQ,. the ~,pres~i, 1:>Y J!laldng ·. i1'-fonned 'judgnieµts concerning the 
progress made j,n J~~q unct.er 5qbsequ.en' PQSt".'\Var goyenu,:mmt~ "'." first 1.mdc:r 
the CoalitiQn Pro".is\Qnal, A\Jth()Jjty (CPA), the. ini~ia•. Coalition. g():vernment 
ii\. lt'aq, Jollovred by, .th~, Jraqi · irtterlm :80Yefl!PlyJ;lt ;and. finally. •elected. Iraqi 
governments. ·'. ,.-, . . 
Economic Freedom Datd 'Set. .. The Heritage .Index refleets the' absence of 
government constraint. or' coercio'n· tin' the production, ··tlistribution ·or 
consumption · o'f · gooa~· iand, · istrvi2es. -Stripped to its •essentials'; economic 
free.dom is concerned witfi"prbperty tights and choice: To trt~~l'Sure economic 
freedom· the Heritage Fonn:daddH/Wall Stteef Journal !:rnilex "takes ten 
different faclotSin:to accoufit: "1 • -: " ••. 
, '., :. . •I " ' \ ·· \":. r i ' . '-• \ 
1. Trad,e PQ1ic:Y <, '" ": · 
2. Fi~cal burden of goY~.miµeQt. , . 
3. Govemment_.inter\ieniion iii the economy 
4. rvfon;etC\1)'ppl,icy,;,L,, ., • "" .. 
S. ~~nkingRJ-~.Jiptio,c~J•r "' ···.· /, . 
6. 9apif~l fl9ow..s, ;m~f,qr~~~ in~~stment 
7. Wages and prices ·· i ·. 
8. Property ri~ts 
9. Regulattqri"''.1 -' ·· 1·• ·· · 
10.Irifonrial fuatket iu '· 
r ·;_,J. t,;-: 
Implied in .these measures is the notion. tbat econQ1pic free4om also 
requires govenunents to refrain fro111 many activities. "'fhey must refrain from 
actions that •interfere with personal choice; ; voluntary ::exchange, and 'the 
freedom to enter and compete in labor and product markefs.' ~conorriic 
freedom is reduced when taxes, government expenditures, and regulations are 
substituted for persoiial chqice, · \lolutiiary' exchange and market coordination. 
Restrictions 'that. "limit eritry)tit~)' Q<:dupations ·and· t>usitiess"iictivities:a:lso 
,, .. ~-<!',,.·. ·-r~····· .,._.,.,.·,..,,., .. --· .. ,.,~~. ·-, 
retard economic freedom. , · , · · · · .'" 
The index·· prp\ii4es ' a (ramewo* Jor- und~rstanding -Pl.i\tJY facto1,f that 
likely contribute. to the 'size' of the 'shadow' econotny: '(a) ~ow ;9p~,n 'coP,.~w:,es 
are to competition; (b) the degree of state intervention in the economy 
Whether through' tAxatlon,·:speridifig or ·overregu1ation, iltid ·(C) the 'strength 
and independence of a country's judiciary to enforce rules an,d protect private 
property. ~ - ' c " \;..· : ., , •• · 
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Over the 1995-1999 period Iraq scored very low on all aspects of 
economic freedom averaging '.ft score ,of 4.85 (with· 5.0 the lowest possible 
score) for all ten nieasures.n~ted aJ:>ove.Jhe country averaged 5.0 in all areas 
except regulation where it scor~d 4.0, making it one ofthe least free countries 
of the world. ' · · ' 
The Governance Data Set. - While the ranking of countries on the basis of 
their relative progress in attaining iµiproved governance is inherently 
subjective, the World Bank study note4 above provides a set ,of rankings 
incorporating the full extent of our knowledge about this pheno111enon .. More 
precisely, ·the World . Bank data ·set presents a· set of estimates of six 
dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories . for. 1996, 
1998, 2000 and 2002. Country sc.ores ·are scaled from positive (above the 
nom:l) to negative {below the norm values). 
Voice .·and.Accountability. - this. variable m~asures various aspects of the 
political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure 
the extent to which the citizens ofa country are able to participate inJhe 
selection of 'governments. Also included in this variable are . indicators 
measuring the independence.of the media. As might be imagined, Iraq scored 
very low in this area, averaging a score <>f-1,788 over the 1996-1998 period. 
Political Stability. atid · Absence of Violence. - This · governance cluster 
combines several indicators which measure perceptions ofthe likelihood that 
the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown. Again Iraq's 
score of-2.601 was one of the lowest. 
Government Effectiveness. - This variable combines aspects of the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of 
civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, 
and the credibility of the .government's commitment to ,policies. Iraq's 
average score for the period was again quite low, -1.684. 
Regulatory Quality. - This aspect of governance is more focused on the 
policies · themselves. It includes measures of the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision as 
well as perceptions of the burdens imposed :by excessive regulation in areas 
such as foreign· trade and business ctevelopment. Iraq had one of the lowest 
scores in this area, -3.009. 
Rule of Law . . - Included in this dimension of govema,nce are. several 
indicators which measure the extent to which the dtizens of a couiitry have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These in'(lude perceptions .q'f 
•· \ .1 
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the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and pre<Jictability•of thejudiciary, 
and the enforceability of contracts'. Iraq's score i.n tbis area was -'l .583.1 • 
Control o/Co~pi{o~ .~ This dimens~pn. rlf ·governance .nfoasur~~. per9e,ptfons 
of corruption. By this measure corriipHon is defined as tlie exercise o'f pµ9lic 
power for private gain. It is often a manifestation of a lack o( respect of both 
the corrupter and the corrupted for· the· rules which goverii their interactions, 
and hence represents a failure of governance. Rampant corruption in Iraq 
during this period earned the country a score of_.t.315_, 
To put Iraq's perform~ce ,i~ .gove,man9e .~nd eco~omic free9om in 
context .• it is ins~ctiv~ to examitie hQW, the coun~ry compares.·w,ith the 
situatiop fu other ·nations, e.specially with. r~~at:d to those having relatively 
large shadow economies. In this regard, a .. roµgh examination oCsevera1 
groupings of countries based on their mean ·averages' on each one of the 
governance/economic freedom indices,••suggested the greatest environmental 
differences occurred between countiies vtrhen grouped above and :below an 
irlfoimal economy share of GNP of 20% (f ab1e I). . ' 
The gap between the high (greater than 20% of GNP) and 'low (less than 
20% of GNP)· informal• economy 'cotintries· iS particularly evident .in· the tnain 
dimensions of governance (lower values in :fable '1 represent a worsening of 
governance). Differences are especially gi:~at ~ the, areas of control of 
corruption, govemme,nt effectiveness and potitic~l stability, . with the high 
informal economies. consistently scoring w~~l' beJow t~li\t of the. low informal 
gtoWth countries. . .. · ... 
While the gaps between the high and low informal. eeonomy countries are 
not as great in the economic freedom area, 'they ,,are still ·fairly consistent 
(higher values in Table l for .. these variables•.'signifies a worsening of 
economic freedom) with the higher informal economy countries attaining less 
progress in most of ..these areas, especially trade policy,•inonetary policy, 
banking and finance, property rights and of course the informal market. 
3.2. Quantitative Estimate of Iraq's Shadow.Economy. - To determine which 
of the governance/economic freedom indices were statistically significant in 
defining the high .and low informal economy environments, a Discriminant 
Analysis7 (or profiling) of the high and .low .shadow economy groups was 
undertaken using all of the governance and economic freedom ,indices as 
discriminating (independent) variables. The results were highly significant 
with . a Clear delineation occurring between the two groups ; of countries. 
~ . ' ' 
7 For a description of this technique see: SPSS ( 1999).' 
' 
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Somewhat surprisingly, three governance measures (in order of importance): 
(1) control of corruption, (2) voice and accountability, and (3) political 
stability were the only variables statistically significant in fonning unique 
environments delineating the high shadow economies from those with a 
relatively small amount of activities perfonned by · shadow 
finns/entrepreneurs. 
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environments, 88.6% (70 of 79 countries) of the greater than 20% GN!?, 
countries were correctly classified in the high infonnal cobptry group, while 
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75.0% (22 of 29 countries) of those countries with an informal economy less 
than 20% of GNP w~re correctly classifi~ in the. Jow i11formal economy 
country group. . •.. . • . · 
Although no data on Iraq's illformal economy exists, Qn the. pasis of its 
governance and economic freedom. scores,, the coi.mtry fits the profile of a 
high informal economy (99.7% chance of placement in this group) country. 
Given Iraq's level of corruption, . voice and accountability and political 
stability, the model predicts Iraq's infonnal economy to have been around 
35% of GNP toward the end of the 1990s. 
A useful index (technically the first discriminant function) produced by the 
Discriminant Analysis (SPSS,, 1999) ranks· countries in. terms of the relative 
attainment of the environment defined bythe three governance measures: (1) 
control of corruption, (2) voice @d apcountability8, and (3) political stability. 
In essence the discriminant function has created a governance index which in 
tum is highly ass9ciated with.::the size of the shadow economy across 
countries. As one moves from low to higher ,values on the governance index, 
the chance increases (>fbeing classified as a. low informal economy country. 
In tum, a further analysis of this governance index/shadow economy index 
provides additional insights as to some of the factors closely associated with 
the relative size of shadow ecoriotriies across countries . .For this purpose, a 
classification analysis9 ·of the index was able to iqentify a· number of 
statistically significant categories of countries. Using the 
govemance/econonii¢ freedom ·variables ·described above,, the two most 
significant categories are defined in ·terms of their trade policy (Figure 2). 
One category of countries is rather closed to international trade, while the 
other is comprised of countries adopting a relatively open trade regime. The 
low mea,n of the index values fot the low trade countries indicate that these 
are the countries with the highest shadow economies; the· converse is true for 
the open trade countries. 
Statistically, it is possible to provide m6re detailed classifications of 
countries in botli trade categories. For the countries with high shadow 
economies (closed trade), relative corruption provides the basis of further 
classification of countries. More precisely, four classes of countries exist 
based on their ·trade policy and extent· of corruption. As one moves from left 
to right, the rr1e~n.of)h~ ip,!:ly~ of con)lpticm in, each group faHs: -0.70, ~0.23 
etc. (less corruption). :At the same , time the group mean for the 
. 
8 It should be noted that the sign of this variable in. the disc.rimin.ant function is negative; 
suggesting tliat 'in the context bf Improved control over corruption and increased political 
stability, improved voiceand.acc6untability increase the size of the: infonrial ecottomy. 
,
9
• A description_ 9f this tt:9hnique is ptovid<;d in (S~SS~ ioo I). / ·. 
\ 
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discriminant/shadow economy index increases. This suggests that closed 
trade facilitates a higher level of corruption which in ter1ll manifests itself in 
an expanded share ofoutput controlled by the shadow economy. Conversely, 
reducing corruption in a closed trade environment is an effective way to 
retard the expansion of shadow economies. 
For the countries classified as high trade, the rule of law provides a further 
statistically significant classification of countries. As one might imagine, 
countries with open ttade, yet· low rule of law tend to have a higher 
percentage of output produced in the ~hadow economy. As the rule of law is 
strengthened in these countries the size of the shadow economy contracts 
(again as evidenced by the increasing group means on the 
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Figure 2. Classification analysis: informal economy country groupings along the governance 
dimension 
In short, using the governance and economic freedom data sets a!! 
independent variables, it is apparent that per capita incd~e does not play_,:a 
I 
-· 
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direct role in accounting for the size of the informal ,economy. Instead, the 
country grouping~ are defined in terms.of th~ progress made in ope11jng up to 
the world economy. Those countries that are relativ:eJy :S:lC>.se~.l andinwant i 
oriented (like Iraq at this time) . tend to haye .Jargejqforn:ial ,ecqnomies 
(proxied by the mean score of the discmninant/shado~ JQdex itt the ;Various 
boxes), while those countries .• ()pen Jo the pr~sures and opportunities of 
globalization, have much smaller.infQrmal ecoJ1.omies, 
For Jhe countries with high informal ecor~omies. those who have gained 
more control over. corruption ha ye significantly lpwer: shadow economies. 
Note that the relationship is·progressive: as one mov:es frow. little control of 
corruption (negative indeJC.) to higher .control of corruption, .there is a steady 
improvement in the index related to a reduction ,in the size of the shadow 
economy. 
On the other hand, the· relatively open countries have lowered their 
informal economies through improved rule of law. Again, a steady 
progressive relationship exists. w~ereby improved rule. of law is associated 
with a steady reduction in the size :Of the shadow economy. 
As might have been expected, Iraq fell iri the lowest group of countries in 
terms of the !pghest probability of.a, large informal economy. The prpfile of 
these countries is an inward oriented trade regime . with high levels of 
corruption (Figure 4).:otlier countries ill this group.included oil-based rentier 
economies such as.Nigeria, Venezuela, Indonesia andAzerbaijan. 
Summing up, the analysis presented above suggests ·that the size of the 
shadow economy is largely controlled by factors •.related to governance. 
Corruption stands qutas the key determinant of the informal segments of the 
economy, with countries having ,gained little control over c::orr.uption us{lally 
having the high¢st ·pfobability ()(; poss~ss.iqg (l· l~rge i~fdtn}al economy. In 
turn, corruption ·appeats. to be Uiore of a fa.cJor in tho$~ countries relatively . 
closed to the gfobalization:process. . '. · · ' ~ · · · · · ·· · 
This finding was confirmed with a regressfon analysis. Here the purpose 
was to determine which individual governance/economic freedom variables ~i 
were statistically significant in affecting the size of the infonpal econorpy. A j 
by-product of this analysis was to obtain a precise estimate of Iraq's informal I 
economy around the year 2000. · ; 
In addition to per capita income, the ten economic freedom variaples and ~ 
six governance indices, several dummy variables were added to test for 
particular structural differences across countries. These included a variable 
signifying whether a country was in the greater Middle East region, 10 whether 
10 tn addition to the Aral> Middie East, Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan, ahd tlte Central Asian 
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a country was an oil based rentier state, and, finally, whether or not it could 
be classified as a developed country. The estimated equation found three 
variables statistically significant in affecting the size of the informal 
economy: (a) control of corruption, (b) whether a country was a greater 
Middle Eastern.country, and (c) progress made in building a sound banking 
and finance sector. These variables explained over 50% of the observed 
variation in the size of the infonnal economy across countries. 
Most importantly, the analysis confinned that Iraq's infonnal economy 
was around 35% of GDP in the year 4000. Substituting Iraq's values for the 
three independent variables in the regression equation resulted in a prediction 
of 35.86% of GNP for the size of the country's shadow economy. The high 
standardized coefficient associated with control of conuption (0.842) as 
opposed to 0.193 and 0.206 for Greater Middle East member country and 
banking arid finance development respectively suggests that this is the 
dominant element in explaining the relative size of the informal economy 
across countries. 
Finally, Schneider and Enste (2002, Ch. 5) have calculated the likely 
shadow labor force in a group of developing countries for 1998. They present 
values of the shadow economy labor force in absolute terms, and as a 
percentage of the official labor force under the assumption that the shadow 
economy in rural areas is at least as high as in the cities (where the original 
surveys were taken). While Iraq does not appear in their sample, there is a 
close relationship between the size of the shadow economy and its associated 
labor force. Using the 35 percent of GNP figure for Iraq's shadow economy 
. derived above produces an estimate of a shadow labor force in Iraq at this 
time (1998) of 68.3 percent of the total labor force. This is equivalent to a 
shadow labor force of 32.2 percent of the total population. 
4. Assessment 
The findings noted above and the analysis that underlies them provide 
useful insights into the factors that need to be examined in deriving a measure 
of the current state of the infonnal economy iri Iraq. Clearly a great deal more 
needs to be known about relationships at the sectoral level - conditions in 
agriculture for example, the factors impeding small and medium sized (SME) 
businesses, the role of women in household production, the development of 
survival social networks and so on. 
At this point, given the insurgency and uncertainty sun-ounding political 
developments it is safe to say that large segments ofthe population hav,l! 
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Ta.ble ~. Iraq's ra,nking in the 2004 corruption perceptions index 
Rank Country 2Q04 score "' Confidence range Surveys tised 
I Finland 9.7 9.5- 9.8 9 
2 New Zealand ' 9.6 . 9.4. 9.6 9 
3 Denmark · 9.5 9.3 •9.7 \ 10 
4 Iceland 9.S 
·9.4. 9.7 8 
5 Singapore 9.3 9.2. 9.4 13 
6 Sweden 9.2 :9.1. 9.3' II 
7 SWitterland 9.1 8.9. 9.2 10 
8 Notway 8.9 8;6- 9.1 9 
9 Australia ' 8.8 8.4. 9.1 15 





·6.9. 8.0 19 14 
24 Japan 6.~ 6.2 ~ 7.4 15 
26 fsrael 6.4 5.6· 7.1 JO 
29 Oman 6.1 
29 lJAE 6.1 5.1- 7.1 s 34 
·Bahrain 5.8 5.5 • 6.2 5 
37 Jordan 5.3 4.6-5.9 9 38 Qatar 5.2 4.6" 5.6 4 
39 Tunisia 5.0 4.5 ·5.6 7 
44 Kuwait 
71 Saudi Arabia 3.4 2.7 "4.0 5 
71 Syria 3.4 2.8. 4.1 5 
77 Egypt 3.2 2.7" 3.8 8 
77 Morocco 3.2 2.9. 3.5 7 
77 Turkey 3.2 2.8 - 3.7 13 
87 Iran 2.9 2.2" 3.4 5 
97 Algeria 2.7 2.3- 3.0 ~-97 Lebanon 2.7 2.1. 3.2 5 
108 Libya 2.5 J.9. 3.0 4 
112 Yemen 2.4 
. 1.9-,2.9 ·5. 
l22 Sudan 2.2 io-2.3 5 
129 Iraq v 1.3. 2.8 4 
145 Haiti 1.5 
Source: Trans~cy lntCll)ational C"9rpor11tion (2005). 
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reverted to the survival relationships characteristic of the period of sanctions 
in the 1990s. In one sense the situation is similar to that of the 1990s - a 
central government incapable of acquiring popular support and of exert,ing 
control over the economy (Oxford Analytica, 2003). An eerie passage from 
Braude (2003, pp. 117-118) captures the mood of that time: 
But despite the pervasiveness of Saddam's secret police and network of 
informants, the regime could never keep tabs on everyone in its sprawling 
cities. With the onset of sanctions, which made a good deal of legitimate 
business unprofita,ble and many standarc;i goods unattainable in the lawful 
market, a sprawling black market and a minor epidemic of organized crime 
evolved. • .. The flipside of intimidation became lawlessness, as a muted 
anarchy came to underlie the thin veil of a highly surveilled society. Legal and 
bureaucratic restrictions became increasingly irrelevant. 
Daily news coming out of Iraq of economic mismanagement (Al-Saadi, 
2004), vast black markets in gasoline (Noozz.com, 2005), increased crime, 
and shortages of critical inputs (Murphy, 2005) do not bode well and suggest 
that if anything the current size of the shadow economy is considerably larger 
than in the late 1990s. Another ominous sign is a recently released index of 
corruption for 2004 (Table 2). The prestigious Transparency International 
Corporation (2005) ranks Iraq as the most corrupt country in the Middle East. 
The country's current ranking is 129th out of 145 nations worldwide. 
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ABSTRACT 
How large is Iraq's shadow or informal economy? Unfortunately in Iraq's case, 
data limitations preclude the use of the standard methods of estimating these 
activities. Alternatively, using a large data base of governance and economic 
freedom variables it was found that governance measures, especially the control of 
corruption, best accounted for the differences in the size of shadow economies across 
countries. On the assumption that Iraq followed this normal pattern, the country's 
shadow economy should have accounted for around 35% of Gross National Product 
and 68% of the country's labor force at the end of Saddam Hussein regime. 
JEL classification: 017, 053, 010 
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